The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate on Palestine

http://www.2nd-thoughts.org/id174.html

The Balfour Declaration

November 2nd, 1917 

Dear Lord Rothschild, 

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." 

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 

Yours sincerely, 

Arthur James Balfour 

The Palestine Mandate
The Council of the League of Nations:
July 24, 1922
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and 
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and 
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and 
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and 
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and 
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and 
Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League Of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows: 

ARTICLE 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate. 

ART. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. 

ART. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy. 

ART. 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country. 
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
 
ART. 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power. 

ART. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes. 

ART. 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine. 

ART. 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine. 
Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned. 

ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights. 
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders. 

ART. 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine. 

ART. 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land. 
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration. 

ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits. 

ART. 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed. 

ART. 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council. 

ART. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief. 
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. 

ART. 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality. 

ART. 17. The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine. 
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine. 
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies. 

ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area. 
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia. 

ART. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property. 

ART. 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals. 

ART. 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations. 
(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D. 
(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat. 
Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery. 
(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity. 
No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department. 
(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed. 
(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department. 
(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest. 
(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds. 
(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find. 

ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic. 

ART. 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities. 

ART. 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report. 

ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18. 

ART. 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 

ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate. 

ART. 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities. 
The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League. 

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

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Jordan illegally entered the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1948 and remained in occupation until 1967

q.v. http://www.mythsandfacts.com/index.asp  http://www.justicenow4israel.com/  http://alargerisrael.com/

http://www.2nd-thoughts.org/id44.html

Jordan illegally entered the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1948 and remained in occupation until 1967. It attempted to annex the territory in 1951, but that annexation was recognized only by Britain and Pakistan; not even by Egypt nor any other Arab state.

  

Egypt, similarly occupied Gaza in 1948 in violation of UN resolution 181, but unlike Jordan Egypt did not attempt to annex it and significantly, did not accept the return of Gaza in its peace agreement with Israel.

 

That territorial adjustments were contemplated from the earliest days is confirmed by article II.2. of the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, which specifically stated: "no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Party hereto in the peaceful settlement of the Palestine questions, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations".

 

As Jordan no longer makes any claim to the West Bank and Egypt makes no claim on Gaza the only remaining claimants are Israel and the Palestinians. As to who has the stronger claim, the Palestinians never had any title to these territories. Moreover, international law distinguishes clearly between "aggressive conquest" and territorial acquisition after a war of self-defense. Former US State Department Legal Advisor Stephen Schwebel, who later headed the International Court of Justice in the Hague, wrote in 1970 regarding Israel's case: "Where the prior holder of territory had seized that territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title”

 

 

Significantly, even the UN rejected Soviet efforts to have Israel branded as the aggressor in the Six-Day War.

 

In these circumstances, the most accurate and realistic description of the West Bank and Gaza is disputed territory, whose final disposition will be determined by negotiation as provided in resolution 242 (about which more later).

 

“Disputed”, rather than “occupied” territories is the designation used in other similar situations such as Kashmir,  

which is claimed by India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris and even the Northwest Passage which Canada claims as part of its territorial waters, while the United States regards it as international waters, not to speak of Taiwan and Tibet.  

(See "Disputed territories around the world

 

It is ironical that neither Jordan nor Egypt offered to create a Palestinian state in these territories when they were in a position to do so.

Legality of the occupation

Quite apart from its historical ties to Judea, Samaria and especially Jerusalem, Israel has a very strong claim to both territories. They were unambiguously allocated to the Jewish state in the League of Nations Mandate the preamble of which stated that its purpose was "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people in Mandatory Palestine" (which included not only present day Israel, but also the West Bank and what is now known as Jordan).

 

Jordan was hived off in terms of Article 25, of the mandate, which entitled the Mandatory, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of the mandate, as it may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions. As such permission was given in respect of territory east, but not west of the Jordan, the West Bank, Jerusalem and present day Israel remained allocated for the Jewish national home. Their capture by Israel in a defensive war from states that originally seized them by armed aggression was therefore fully justified.

 

The late Eugene W. Rostow, who played a leading role in producing the famous Resolution 242, as well as the late Professor Julius Stone, one of the twentieth century's leading authorities on the Law of Nations, both pronounced that the Jewish right of settlement in the area is equivalent in every way to the right of the existing Palestinian population to live there. According to Rostow, the Armistice Lines of 1949, which are part of the West Bank boundary, represent nothing but the position of the contending armies when the final cease-fire was achieved in the War of Independence. And the Armistice Agreements specifically provide, except in the case of Lebanon, that the demarcation lines can be changed only by agreement when the parties move from armistice to peace. Resolution 242 is based on that provision of the Armistice Agreements and states certain criteria that would justify changes in the demarcation lines when the parties make peace. (See articles by Rostow)

 

Acknowledgement of the legality of the occupation does not preclude advocating withdrawal from part or all of the West Bank in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. It is however, intellectually dishonest to use the invalid assumption that the occupation is illegal to bolster a case for such withdrawal.

 

The legal position

An authoritative clear analysis of the legal status of the West bank and Gaza in terms of international law, by Australian lawyer, Ian Lacey, is available at

http://www.aijac.org.au/resources/reports/international_law.pdf

 

In an update, Ian lacey adds

that in his view, any possible concept of an occupation came to an end with the Oslo Accords.

The current binding legal instrument under the Accords is the Interim Agreement of 1995, which governs the status of the Territories on an interim basis until a final status agreement is negotiated. Under Article XI all of the civil powers and responsibilities in the whole of the Territories are now exercised by the Palestinian Authority, although in the lightly populated area still defined as Area C, this does not include powers relating to territory. The result is that 100% of the Palestinian population of the territories is presently governed by the Palestinian Authority. 

|Under Article XII(1), ie. by express agreement with the Palestinians, Israel retains responsibility for defense and the overall security of Israelis and settlements, and has the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility. In other words Israel forces are present in the Territories by agreement and only to the extent made necessary by attacks on Israelis.

Further, under Article XXXI permanent status negotiations are to include Jerusalem, Settlements and Borders. In other words it is expressly acknowledged that existing Settlements are not illegal during the interim period, and that ultimate borders will be subject to negotiation. This reinforces the description of the Territories as disputed. As can be seen, they are certainly not occupied in any sense.

The legal position may enter a state of flux as a result of the election of a Palestinian government which has expressly stated that it does not intend to enter into the permanent status negotiations contemplated by Oslo. If the Interim Agreement were to be officially repudiated by the PA, and if that repudiation was officially accepted by Israel, then the legal situation would revert to the status quo ante. Israel would remain the only State body entitled to exercise sovereignty in the Territories, certainly until a permanent peace was negotiated, and arguably with a right of unilateral annexation, in whole or part, for the purposes of defense against future aggression, and as occurred in Europe after the Second World War.

 

What is meant by “end the occupation”?

The mantra 'end the occupation' is in itself wooly and should not be used without clarification of its intended meaning. Some assume it refers only to territory gained by Israel in 1967. Others refer to all land beyond the 1947 partition boundaries. But the insurmountable obstacle to any long-term peaceful solution is that many Palestinian and Arab spokespeople openly declare that there is no place for Israel at all and that they will continue their attacks until Israel ceases to exist. Until his last days, the late Chairman Arafat wore a badge on his uniform depicting a Palestinian state, which included the entire area of present-day Israel, from the Jordan to the Mediterranean.  This strategic Palestinian goal goes a long way to explain the dramatic rise in terror attacks while peace talks were in progress during 1993 and 1994.

 

Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank should not be seen as correction of an illegal situation. Rather it is a declaration, that despite Israel's presence in these territories being completely justified by the circumstances, which prompted the 1967 war, and despite their legality in terms of international law, withdrawals and territorial adjustments have been made and more will be offered in a sincere effort to attain a meaningful peace.

 

Very few indeed, even among the most ardent advocates of 'ending the occupation' call for Israel to relinquish, the Western Wall and access to Mount Scopus which had been inaccessible to Israel prior to 1967. If suggestions for a settlement are to be meaningful, the misleading expression 'end the occupation' must be avoided and replaced by the concept of 'territorial compromise' as contemplated in the careful wording of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions require the Arab states and Israel to make peace, and that when "a just and lasting peace" is reached in the Middle East, Israel should withdraw from some but not all of the territory it occupied in the course of the 1967 war. The Resolutions leave it to the parties to agree on the peace borders.

 

Much has been written about the implications of Resolution 242 and if we are to avoid the distortions introduced by propagandists, obviously, the most reliable source from whom to seek clarification are the persons who drafted it.  In drafting Resolution 242, British Ambassador to the UN in 1967, Lord Caradon, and American Ambassador, Arthur Goldberg, deliberately omitted a demand for Israel to return to the pre-1967 borders. In an interview in the Beirut Daily Star on June 12, 1974, Lord Caradon stated: 

"It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967 because these positions were undesirable and artificial. After all, they were just the places where the soldiers on each side happened to be on the day the fighting stopped in 1948. They were just armistice lines. That's why we didn't demand that the Israelis return to them, and I think we were right not to."

 

Recommended Reading:  (Click here)

Articles by the Late Eugene W. Rostow, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs between 1966 and 1969 who played a leading role in producing the famous Resolution 242.

a. Historical Approach to the Issue of Legality of Jewish Settlement Activity  (The New Republic April 23, 1990). 

b.   Are the settlements legal? Resolved. (The New Republic, October 21, 1991).

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Black September

NOTE: JORDAN IS "PALESTINE"

In the second episode of this six-part series, Al Jazeera looks at the events that led to the PLO's expulsion from Jordan and the birth of the Black September Organisation. The Palestinians took full advantage of the state of chaos that followed Arab defeat in the 1967 Six-Day war. Palestinian guerrilla factions consolidated their grip on the refugee camps in Arab states and hundreds of fresh recruits swelled their ranks. The image of the young fedayeen - or freedom fighters - clad in the traditional Palestinian headscarf became an icon of resistance. While some Arab regimes vied for influence among the Palestinians as a way of gaining leverage on the regional scene, not all held the Palestinians in such high esteem. In Jordan, armed Palestinians strolled through the streets - enjoying freedom of movement and launching operations from Jordanian territory against Israel. A bloody showdown was on the horizon - not with Israel, but with fellow Arabs.

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Israel: IDF on brink of abyss over draft dodging

NOTE: Voltaire.net is a Marxist propaganda site.

http://www.voltairenet.org/article163565.html

Israeli Army’s Personnel Directorate chief, Major-General Avi Zamir, says number of Jewish youths evading military service may reach 40% over next decade.

Zamir, who focused on the rising numbers of draft dodgers, warned that the coming decade may see up to 40% of Jewish teenager evade military service.

The situation, he added, can turn even worse: "Taking into consideration Israeli Arab youths, we are facing a situation in which 70% of youths will not enlist to military to national service".

"Even now the notion of ’the people’s army’ is fraying and if these trends continue we’ll be on the brink of an abyss," he said.

According to IDF (Israel Defense Forces) data for 2008, 72% of teenage Jewish boys and 54% of girls enlist in the military, placing draft dodging rates at 37%.

Zamir was especially critical of the 38% of teenage girls who use a false claim of religious observance to dodge the draft. "That, to me, is cynical abuse of the law. We’re not too far off from seeing those numbers hit 50%."

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The Power of Political Misinformation

http://www.2nd-thoughts.org/id204.html

By Shankar Vedantam Monday, September 15, 2008; A06

Have you seen the photo of Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin brandishing a rifle while wearing a U.S. flag bikini? Have you read the e-mail saying Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama was sworn into the U.S. Senate with his hand placed on the Koran? Both are fabricated -- and are among the hottest pieces of misinformation in circulation.   As the presidential campaign heats up, intense efforts are underway to debunk rumors and misinformation. Nearly all these efforts rest on the assumption that good information is the antidote to misinformation.   But a series of new experiments show that misinformation can exercise a ghostly influence on people's minds after it has been debunked -- even among people who recognize it as misinformation. In some cases, correcting misinformation serves to increase the power of bad information.   In experiments conducted by political scientist John Bullock at Yale University, volunteers were given various items of political misinformation from real life. One group of volunteers was shown a transcript of an ad created by NARAL Pro-Choice America that accused John G. Roberts Jr., President Bush's nominee to the Supreme Court at the time, of "supporting violent fringe groups and a convicted clinic bomber."   A variety of psychological experiments have shown that political misinformation primarily works by feeding into people's preexisting views. People who did not like Roberts to begin with, then, ought to have been most receptive to the damaging allegation, and this is exactly what Bullock found. Democrats were far more likely than Republicans to disapprove of Roberts after hearing the allegation. Bullock then showed volunteers a refutation of the ad by abortion-rights supporters. He also told the volunteers that the advocacy group had withdrawn the ad. Although 56 percent of Democrats had originally disapproved of Roberts before hearing the misinformation, 80 percent of Democrats disapproved of the Supreme Court nominee afterward. Upon hearing the refutation, Democratic disapproval of Roberts dropped only to 72 percent.   Republican disapproval of Roberts rose after hearing the misinformation but vanished upon hearing the correct information. The damaging charge, in other words, continued to have an effect even after it was debunked among precisely those people predisposed to buy the bad information in the first place.   Bullock found a similar effect when it came to misinformation about abuses at the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Volunteers were shown a Newsweekreport that suggested a Koran had been flushed down a toilet, followed by a retraction by the magazine. Where 56 percent of Democrats had disapproved of detainee treatment before they were misinformed about the Koran incident, 78 percent disapproved afterward. Upon hearing the refutation, Democratic disapproval dropped back only to 68 percent -- showing that misinformation continued to affect the attitudes of Democrats even after they knew the information was false.   Bullock and others have also shown that some refutations can strengthen misinformation, especially among conservatives. Political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler provided two groups of volunteers with the Bush administration's prewar claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. One group was given a refutation -- the comprehensive 2004 Duelfer report that concluded that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction before the United States invaded in 2003. Thirty-four percent of conservatives told only about the Bush administration's claims thought Iraq had hidden or destroyed its weapons before the U.S. invasion, but 64 percent of conservatives who heard both claim and refutation thought that Iraq really did have the weapons. The refutation, in other words, made the misinformation worse.   A similar "backfire effect" also influenced conservatives told about Bush administration assertions that tax cuts increase federal revenue. One group was offered a refutation by prominent economists that included current and former Bush administration officials. About 35 percent of conservatives told about the Bush claim believed it; 67 percent of those provided with both assertion and refutation believed that tax cuts increase revenue.   In a paper approaching publication, Nyhan, a PhD student at Duke University, and Reifler, at Georgia State University, suggest that Republicans might be especially prone to the backfire effect because conservatives may have more rigid views than liberals: Upon hearing a refutation, conservatives might "argue back" against the refutation in their minds, thereby strengthening their belief in the misinformation. Nyhan and Reifler did not see the same "backfire effect" when liberals were given misinformation and a refutation about the Bush administration's stance on stem cell research. Bullock, Nyhan and Reifler are all Democrats.   Reifler questioned attempts to debunk rumors and misinformation on the campaign trail, especially among conservatives: "Sarah Palin says she was against the Bridge to Nowhere," he said, referring to the pork-barrel project Palin once supported before she reversed herself. "Sending those corrections to committed Republicans is not going to be effective, and they in fact may come to believe even more strongly that she was always against the Bridge to Nowhere."

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Kanamits Offer Peace & Prosperity

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Maps of Historical Israel, Palestine, and the Region

http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_maps.php

Photo © The Pedagogic Center, Jewish Agency

British Mandate for Palestine 1920-1948

Many of the issues concerning Israel and historical Palestine involve geography; nothing helps more than good maps to improve understanding. In this section, we recommend sources of good maps covering the history, current status, and issues still in dispute regarding Israel and the region.

As with any "historical document" maps should be carefully evaluated. For example, the borders of the Palestine region prior to the British Mandate were undefined, particularly in desert regions with no settled population. The British Mandate from the League of Nations left borders subject to interpretation, leading to disputes that took many years to resolve including some not yet resolved. And there is no one map of the "Barak proposals in 2000" -- as various meetings were held, many proposals were made, modified, and revised so maps have to be carefully anchored in time and related to specific meetings and proposals. An earlier or later map may have offered more or fewer concessions from Israel.

This page was prepared in cooperation with Dr Motti Friedman and Gila Ansell Brauner of the The Pedagogic Center, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish Agency for Israel.

Israel and Palestine: Before 1948

• Region of Palestine in 1020 BC, the Kingdom of Israel under Saul (1915 map)
• Map of ancient Asia Minor, showing Syria as the entire region (1849 map)
• Eastern Roman Empire map, showing Palestine region within Syria (1916 map)
• Ottoman Empire, 1481-1683, showing Syria as the entire region (1923 map)
• Ottoman rule, on the eve of World War I
• The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine - 1920
• The British Alteration of the Mandate - 1923
• Peel Commission partition plan, 1937
• UN Partition Plan (September 1947)
• UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (November 1947) Palestine partition map

Israel and Region: 1948 to 1967

• Arab attacks on Israel, 1948
• Israel Armistice Lines 1949-1967
• Fedayeen Raids 1951-1956
• Sinai Campaign, 1956
• 1967 War

Israel and Region: Since 1967

• Ceasefire Lines Following the 1967 Six-Day War
• Disengagement Agreements Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War
• Israel 1993 - Borders and Ceasefire Lines
• Judea and Samaria showing Palestinian Authority Areas A & B - March 2000
• West Bank Final Status Map Presented by Israel May 2000
• Israeli Proposal to Palestinians and Syria July, 2000
• Final Status Map Presented by Israel at Taba, January 2001
• Security Incidents Map and Timeline (provided to AIPAC by israelinsider.com)

Satellite Images

• Middle East
• Israel
• Middle East and N. Africa
• Middle East at Night

Invalid Palestinian Arab Maps

Anti-Israel forces have made an industry out of producing invalid maps that either deny the existence of Israel altogether or distort the history and modern situation. This section presents a few examples.

• Source: Palestinian Authority, State Information Service
• Source: pro-Palestinian Arab Website
• Source: Canadian pro-Palestinian Arab Website

Sources and additional reading on this topic:

• Hasbara Maps, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish Agency for Israel
• Israel in Maps, State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Maps of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
• Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement Maps, State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Map Room, Focus on Jerusalem
• A Land Divided, Time Magazine
• Palestine Boundaries 1833-1947, Archive Editions, publisher's description
• Maps of Israel, Jewish Internet Association
• Ancient Maps of Jerusalem, The Jewish National and University Library & The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• Settlement Maps extracted from reports published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace

PALESTINE FACTS
Home | History | Maps | FAQs

© 2010 palestinefacts.org. All rights reserved worldwide.

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For want of a nail

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of the horse, the rider was lost;
For want of the rider, the battle was lost;
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost;
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail

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Insult Generators & Other Chomskybots For The Masses

Liberal Insult Generator

http://www.fightliberals.com/Inside-the-Book/Liberal-Insult-Generator.html

Conservative Insult Generator

http://www.fightconservatives.com/Inside-the-Book/Conservative-Insult-Generator.html

Shakespearean Insult Generator

http://www.mainstrike.com/mstservices/handy/insult.html

Chomskybot (reads like postmodern feminist rhetoric)

http://rubberducky.org/cgi-bin/chomsky.pl

Country Song Generator

http://www.mainstrike.com/mstservices/handy/Country/song.html

Random Quote Generator

http://www.mainstrike.com/mstservices/handy/randomquotes.html

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The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

T.S. Eliot (1888–1965).  Prufrock and Other Observations.  1917.

1. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

S'io credesse che mia risposta fosse A persona che mai tornasse al mondo, Questa fiamma staria senza piu scosse. Ma perciocche giammai di questo fondo Non torno vivo alcun, s'i'odo il vero, Senza tema d'infamia ti rispondo.     LET us go then, you and I, When the evening is spread out against the sky Like a patient etherised upon a table; Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets, The muttering retreats         5 Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells: Streets that follow like a tedious argument Of insidious intent To lead you to an overwhelming question …         10 Oh, do not ask, "What is it?" Let us go and make our visit.   In the room the women come and go Talking of Michelangelo.   The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes,         15 The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening, Lingered upon the pools that stand in drains, Let fall upon its back the soot that falls from chimneys, Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden leap,         20 And seeing that it was a soft October night, Curled once about the house, and fell asleep.   And indeed there will be time For the yellow smoke that slides along the street, Rubbing its back upon the window-panes;         25 There will be time, there will be time To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet; There will be time to murder and create, And time for all the works and days of hands That lift and drop a question on your plate;         30 Time for you and time for me, And time yet for a hundred indecisions, And for a hundred visions and revisions, Before the taking of a toast and tea.   In the room the women come and go         35 Talking of Michelangelo.   And indeed there will be time To wonder, "Do I dare?" and, "Do I dare?" Time to turn back and descend the stair, With a bald spot in the middle of my hair—         40 [They will say: "How his hair is growing thin!"] My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin, My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin— [They will say: "But how his arms and legs are thin!"] Do I dare         45 Disturb the universe? In a minute there is time For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.   For I have known them all already, known them all:— Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons,         50 I have measured out my life with coffee spoons; I know the voices dying with a dying fall Beneath the music from a farther room.   So how should I presume?   And I have known the eyes already, known them all—         55 The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase, And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall, Then how should I begin To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?         60   And how should I presume?   And I have known the arms already, known them all— Arms that are braceleted and white and bare [But in the lamplight, downed with light brown hair!] It is perfume from a dress         65 That makes me so digress? Arms that lie along a table, or wrap about a shawl.   And should I then presume?   And how should I begin?       .      .      .      .      . Shall I say, I have gone at dusk through narrow streets         70 And watched the smoke that rises from the pipes Of lonely men in shirt-sleeves, leaning out of windows?…   I should have been a pair of ragged claws Scuttling across the floors of silent seas.       .      .      .      .      . And the afternoon, the evening, sleeps so peacefully!         75 Smoothed by long fingers, Asleep … tired … or it malingers, Stretched on the floor, here beside you and me. Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, Have the strength to force the moment to its crisis?         80 But though I have wept and fasted, wept and prayed, Though I have seen my head [grown slightly bald] brought in upon a platter, I am no prophet—and here's no great matter; I have seen the moment of my greatness flicker, And I have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker,         85 And in short, I was afraid.   And would it have been worth it, after all, After the cups, the marmalade, the tea, Among the porcelain, among some talk of you and me, Would it have been worth while,         90 To have bitten off the matter with a smile, To have squeezed the universe into a ball To roll it toward some overwhelming question, To say: "I am Lazarus, come from the dead, Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all"—         95 If one, settling a pillow by her head,   Should say: "That is not what I meant at all.   That is not it, at all."   And would it have been worth it, after all, Would it have been worth while,         100 After the sunsets and the dooryards and the sprinkled streets, After the novels, after the teacups, after the skirts that trail along the floor— And this, and so much more?— It is impossible to say just what I mean! But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen:         105 Would it have been worth while If one, settling a pillow or throwing off a shawl, And turning toward the window, should say:   "That is not it at all,   That is not what I meant, at all."       .      .      .      .      .         110 No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be; Am an attendant lord, one that will do To swell a progress, start a scene or two, Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool, Deferential, glad to be of use,         115 Politic, cautious, and meticulous; Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse; At times, indeed, almost ridiculous— Almost, at times, the Fool.   I grow old … I grow old …         120 I shall wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled.   Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach? I shall wear white flannel trousers, and walk upon the beach. I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each.   I do not think that they will sing to me.         125   I have seen them riding seaward on the waves Combing the white hair of the waves blown back When the wind blows the water white and black.   We have lingered in the chambers of the sea By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown         130 Till human voices wake us, and we drown.

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Barry Rubin - Radical Islamism: An Introductory Primer

http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2010/01/radical-islamism-introductory-primer.html

Posted:

 07 Jan 2010 05:47 PM PST

Please subscribe

The following is intended as a work in progress to provide a very brief discussion of issues involving radical Islamism. Naturally, it is too short to make all points, deal with all aspects, and cover all details. I plan to expand it in future to include possible solutions.

By Barry Rubin

A young American named Ramy Zamzam, arrested in Pakistan for trying to fight alongside the Taliban, responded in an interview with the Associated Press: "We are not terrorists. We are jihadists, and jihad is not terrorism." 

What he says is well worth bearing in mind in order to understand the great conflict of our era. First and foremost, Jihadism or radical Islamism is far more than mere terrorism. It is a revolutionary movement in every sense of the word. It seeks to overthrow existing regimes and replace them with governments that will transform society into a nightmarishly repressive system. 

And so one might put it this way: Revolutionary Islamism is the main strategic problem in the world today. Terrorism is the main tactical problem. 

What is Islamism?

Radical Islamism is the doctrine that each Muslim majority country—politics, economy, society—should be ruled by a totalitarian dictatorship guided by the given movement’s definition of proper Islam. What Marxism was to Communism, and fascism to Nazism, Jihadism is to Islamism. 

In some cases, Islamists have a wider ambition to transform the entire world, starting with Europe. While this may seem ridiculous to most Westerners, it does not seem so to the Islamists who hold that view.

Only a minority of Muslims is Islamist but that sector has grown sharply over the last twenty years and seems to be on the increase still. Muslims are also among the greatest opponents of political Islamism, and often its victims. Among those rejecting it are conservative traditionalist Muslims and Arab (or other types of) nationalists, along with a very small group which can be called liberal reformist.

Three places have been under radical Islamist rule so far: Iran and the Gaza Strip, as well as, temporarily, Afghanistan. An Islamist group using democratic tactics has gained control of the government in Turkey, where it is pursuing a step-by-step attempt to transform that country which may or may not succeed. Radical Islamist movements have been active in well over 60 countries ranging from Australia and Indonesia in the east to Morocco in the west, and even in Europe and North America. 

The fact that radical Islamism relates to a religion, Islam, is very important (see below) but should not blind observers to the fact that this is basically a political movement and not—at least in the modern Western sense—a theological one.

Of course, Islamism is rooted in Islam but a strong opposition to Islamism—a standpoint shared by many Muslims who may motivated by a traditional view of Islam, ethnic or nation-state nationalism, or a different radical ideology (Arab nationalism most likely)—is in no way an expression of bigotry against a religion.
Similarly, the idea that opposition to Islamism is in some way “racist” is absurd since no “race” is involved. Just as opponents of Communism (capitalist, imperialist) and fascism (Jews, Bolsheviks) could be discredited by calling them names, the same is done with those who oppose Islamism. 

Very roughly, Islamism is parallel to Communism and fascism as revolutionary mass movements. Analogies should not be carried too far but are useful in understanding certain basic points. 

There are a wide variety of Islamist groups. A small but energetic international grouping of local organizations called al-Qaida; Muslim Brotherhood branches, Hamas, and Hizballah are the best known. In virtually every Muslim majority country and throughout Western Europe there are such organizations working very hard to gain state power.

What is the relationship of Islamism to Islam?

Islamism grows out of Islam and its advocates easily find widely accepted and very basic Islamic principles that justify their world view and behavior. But Islamism is an interpretation of Islam and not the only one possible. Indeed, for centuries there have been different interpretations. 

To argue that Islamism is the inevitable or “correct” interpretation of Islam is as silly as it is to argue that it is some external, heretical ideology which has “hijacked” Islam. A rough parallel can be made with the relationship between Communism and either liberal or democratic socialism, and of fascism compared to conservatism or nationalism.

What Islam “means” can only be interpreted in practice by Muslims in a process of debate and struggle. We will see what happens in the decades to come. For outsiders to claim that Islam is “really” a religion of peace or “really” inevitably aggressive is meaningless. And, yes, no matter how powerful a religious text seems to be worded, followers of that religion can always find ways to ignore or reinterpret those texts.

Just as the Islamists can base their case on original Islamic texts, their Muslim opponents can argue from centuries of practice as well as their own interpretations. The reason that the Islamists (who were earlier called “fundamentalists” for precisely this reason) have to go back to the seventh century texts—though of course there are later ones they use that support their case—is that the intervening years did not follow their precepts. Indeed, that is precisely their complaint.

What eventually emerged is what I call conservative traditionalist Islam which subordinated itself to the rulers. It was no longer a revolutionary doctrine. A key point in this approach was the argument that as long as the ruler was a believing Muslim he should be obeyed. In addition, it was a powerfully held stance that no Muslim could judge and condemn as heretical the believes or behavior of other Muslims. Islamism had to combat these and other tenets of conservative traditionalist Islam.

To summarize in one sentence: we should be absolutely honest in showing how the most sacred texts of Islam appear to validate revolutionary Islamists but we should understand that a struggle is going on among Muslims in which different interpretations are contending. While Islamism is not the only possible interpretation of Islam, its approach is certainly shaped and justified by basic Islamic texts. Unless Muslims and especially qualified clerics reinterpret these tenets, Islamism will continue to have a strong advantage in competing with conservative traditional Islam while liberal reformism will remain a tiny, powerless viewpoint.

It is not that Islam has been hijacked, rather different forces are fighting over control of the steering wheel. 

State sponsorship and nation-state ambitions

It is also, even when not so visibly state-sponsored, often an instrument of specific states, most notably Iran and Syria. Trying to spread Islamist revolution has been a major goal since the takeover of Iran itself and fits closely with Iranian great power ambitions. Not all leaders have pursued this with equal vigor but it is a high priority of the current rulers. A wide variety of organizations from barely disguised front groups to powerful Islamist organizations in Iraq, Lebanon, and among the Palestinians are used for this purpose. Most recently this pattern has been extended to Yemen. Some are pure assets, others client groups with a measure of independence.

While itself not an Islamist regime, Syria has understandably calculated that the Islamist side serves its interests very well. Thus, idea that Syria can easily be pulled away from its alliance with Iran and backing for Islamist groups like Hamas and Hizballah is a fantasy. 

It is quite true that al-Qaida has shown that Islamist groups don’t have to be state-backed but the fact is that many of them still are able to operate because there is a regime behind them.

Tactics and strategies

Like Communist movements in the past, Islamist movements use a wide variety of strategies and tactics. The use of a non-violent tactic—like participation in elections—does not indicate that the group has ceased to be revolutionary. Actually, it is tough pressure by the regime that might force the Islamist leadership to postpone revolutionary activity to the distant future (Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood), repress it altogether (Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood), or get it tied up in electoral knots (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). 

On the other hand, it is no accident that the most militant Islamist groups have flourished where government is weakest: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Iraqi insurgents. 

As for terrorism, that is a strategy and tactic which appeals to these movements for very specific reasons. These include the following points. While the Islamists claim they are only conducting a “defensive jihad”—since there is no caliph, offensive jihad isn’t supposed to happen—they are actually conducting offensive revolution. 

The ideas that America is being attacked because Jihadists dislike its freedom or that it is being targeted because of its policies are both partly true. But precisely the same point could be made about Communism, Nazism, and Japanese imperialism. The problem of American culture and freedom, however, does not relate to what goes on in the United States but the fear that this model will spread inevitably to their own societies.

The complaint about U.S. policy is related to the fact that America is seen as a protector of the regimes the Islamists want to overthrow. The motive here is not that these regimes are tyrannical but that they are not Islamist. Lebanon and Turkey, the most democratic states in the Muslim-majority Middle East, have especially strong Islamist movements.

Another reason for targeting the United States or others in the West is that killing infidels is popular among the Islamists’ constituency as a sign of power to defeat the stronger West. The alternative is to focus terrorist attacks on the local governments. But killing fellow Muslims is less popular and the governments strike back with ferocious repression, while they are more likely to tolerate movements that only attack non-Muslims at home or abroad. 

Why is terrorism used? 

--It expresses the total and dehumanizing hatred Islamists have toward their enemies.

--It shows their disinterest in any compromise since the use of terrorism will dissuade their enemies from making deals.

--They believe that intimidation works and the history of terrorism shows they are not wrong in doing so.

--Terror, at least against non-Muslims, generally pleases their constituency and thus strengthens their base of support.

--This tactic fits with certain Islamic beliefs and texts while well-known clerics do not condemn terrorism, at least against non-Muslims, strongly, explicitly, and consistently.

It is tempting to say that terrorism is a tactic of last resort when repressive regimes permit no other route. But in most—though not all—cases, terrorism is used against the less tyrannical societies for a simple reason: the really repressive ones quickly kill the terrorists. 

Conclusion

Neither more democracy nor more prosperity provides simple solutions to this challenge by Islamism. Many Islamist leaders and cadre come from well-off families. They are driven by ideological, cultural, and religious factors just as left-wing students in the West seek utopian transformations of society. Equally, they are not driven by antagonism to tyranny since their goal is to establish a new, worse tyranny. Both the Nazis and Communists came to power by overthrowing democratic regimes, in part through elections. With Islamism’s strength, the problem is not the lack of democracy by the rulers but the lack of a strong democratic movement to compete with it. 

The Islamist movements will only be defeated by the destruction of violent groups as well as a widespread perception among Muslims that they either cannot take power or are a disaster as rulers. 

Better government and higher living standards in their own countries would help to some extent in some countries. Aside from not overestimating this factor, it should be added that the West has no way to make these things happen, by overthrowing and replacing regimes (as Iraq and Afghanistan show), by changing its own policies, or by pressuring the incumbent regimes to change. 

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books. To see or subscribe to his blog, Rubin Reports.

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Leftist Rag's Humpty Dumpty Revisionism: Hamas is a peace-seeking social network

COMMENT: The Marxist dialectic and postmodern feminist rhetoric of the pro-Jihadi Left produces some of the most remarkable examples of how language can be used to obfuscate and confuse.  Like Humpty Dumpty, words mean what they say they mean, no matter how much evidence can be produced to show it's all stuyot.

Fawaz Gerges must know that Hamas' Charter, like that of the PLO & its clones, clearly states its intention to make all of Israel Judenrein.  Strictly speaking, the Jihadis and their Leftist dhimmis merely repackage the polemics found in Der Strummer.  All their tropes can be found in propaganda films such as "Der Ewige Jude" and "Jude Suss".  The Arabic translation of Mein Kampf is one of the most popular books in the Middle East.

The parallels between Jihadi ideology and that of the NSDAP are never addressed by pseudo scholars such as the author of this screed. 

The real illegal occupiers of Israel are the Muslims, who, with the help of the Leftist claque, blatantly defy International Law and pursue a racist, imperialistic agenda.  All of the land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean is the legal property of the Jewish people.  There are 22 Muslim states surrounding us, and those who can't live under the laws of the State of Israel should make their way back to these places, which are their actual homelands.

http://www.voltairenet.org/article163514.html

The Transformation of Hamas

 
by Fawaz A. Gerges*

Hamas is a viable social movement with an extensive social network and a large popular base. It derives its legitimacy from the Palestinian people. It is also a rational actor that has moved closer to a vision of peace consistent with international law and consensus. Hamas’ political evolution and deepening moderation stand in stark contrast to the rejectionism of the Netanyahu government and call into question which parties are ’hardline’ and which are ’extremist’, notes Fawaz A. Gerges.

---

11 JANUARY 2010 From Damascus (Syria) Countries Palestine/Israel Themes  CentCom: Control of the "Great Middle East"

"We are a national liberation movement and the land of Palestine is not an endowment. Why does every Arab country have the right to want every inch of its land: Lebanon, Syria and also Egypt, who suffered from Israeli occupation? Why are the Palestinians always expected to be the most generous?"  Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas’ political bureau. Something is stirring within the Hamas body politic, a moderating trend that, if nourished and engaged, could transform Palestinian politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process. There are unmistakable signs that the religiously-based radical movement has subtly changed its uncompromising posture on Israel. Although low-key and restrained, those shifts indicate that the movement is searching for a formula that addresses the concerns of Western powers yet avoids alienating its social base. Far from impulsive and unexpected, Hamas’ shift reflects a gradual evolution occurring over the past five years. The big strategic turn occurred in 2005, when Hamas decided to participate in the January 2006 legislative elections and thus tacitly accepted the governing rules of the Palestinian Authority (PA), one of which includes recognition of Israel. Ever since, top Hamas leaders have repeatedly declared they will accept a resolution of the conflict along the 1967 borders. The Damascus-based Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas’ political bureau and considered a hardliner, acknowledged as much in 2008. "We are realists," he said, who recognize that there is "an entity called Israel." Pressed by an Australian journalist on policy changes Hamas might make, Meshal asserted that the organization has shifted on several key points: "Hamas has already changed — we accepted the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, and we took part in the 2006 Palestinian elections." Another senior Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad, was more specific than Meshal, telling journalists in January 2009 that Hamas would be satisfied with ending Israeli control over the Palestinian areas occupied in the 1967 war — the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. In other words, Hamas would not hold out for liberation of the land that currently includes Israel. Previously Hamas moderates had called at times for a tahdia (a minor truce, or "calm") or hudna (a longer-term truce, lasting as long as fifty years), which implies some measure of recognition, if only tacit. The moderates justified their policy shift by using Islamic terms (in Islamic history hudnas sometimes develop into permanent truces). Now leaders appear to be going further; they have made a concerted effort to re-educate the rank and file about the necessity of living side by side with their Jewish neighbors, and in so doing mentally prepare them for a permanent settlement. In Gaza’s mosques pro-Hamas clerics have begun to cite the example of the famed twelfth-century Muslim military commander and statesman Saladin, who after liberating Jerusalem from the Crusaders allowed them to retain a coastal state in the Levant. The point is that if Saladin could tolerate the warring, bloodthirsty Crusaders, then today’s Palestinians should be willing to live peacefully with a Jewish state in their midst. The Saladin story is important because it provides Hamas with religious legitimacy and allows it to justify the change of direction to followers. Hamas’ raison d’être rests on religious legitimation; its leaders understand that they neglect this at their peril. Western leaders and students of international politics should acknowledge that Hamas can no more abandon its commitment to Islamism than the United States can abandon its commitment to liberal democracy. That does not mean Hamas is incapable of change or compromise but simply that its political identity is strongly constituted by its religious legitimation. It should be emphasized as well that Hamas is not monolithic on the issue of peace. There are multiple, clashing viewpoints and constituencies within the movement. Over the years I have interviewed more than a dozen leaders inside and outside the occupied territories. Although on the whole Hamas’ public rhetoric calls for the liberation of all of historic Palestine, not only the territories occupied in 1967, a healthy debate has grown both within and without. Several factors have played a role in the transformation. They include the burden of governing a war-torn Gaza, the devastation from Israel’s 2008-09 attack that caused incalculable human suffering, and increasing public dissatisfaction in Gaza with Hamas rule. Before the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas was known for its suicide bombers, not its bureaucrats, even though between 2002 and 2006 the organization moved from rejectionism toward participation in a political framework that is a direct product of the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. After the elections, the shift continued. "It is much more difficult to run a government than to oppose and resist Israeli occupation," a senior Hamas leader told me while on official business in Egypt in 2007. "If we do not provide the goods to our people, they’ll disown us." Hamas is not just a political party. It’s a social movement, and as such it has a long record of concern about and close attention to public opinion. Given the gravity of deteriorating conditions in Gaza and Hamas’ weak performance during last year’s fighting, it should be no surprise that the organization has undergone a period of fairly intense soul-searching and reassessment of strategic options. Ironically, despite the West’s refusal to regard the Hamas government as legitimate and despite the continuing brutal siege of Gaza, demands for democratic governance within Gaza are driving change. Yet Hamas leaders are fully aware of the danger of alienating more-hardline factions if they show weakness or water down their position and move toward de facto recognition of Israel without getting something substantive in return. Hamas’ strategic predicament lies in striking a balance between, on the one hand, a new moderating and maturing sensibility and, on the other, insistence on the right and imperative of armed resistance. This difficult balance often explains the tensions and contradictions in Hamas’ public and private pronouncements. What is striking about Hamas’ shift toward the peace process is that it has come at a time of critical challenges from Al Qaeda-like jihadist groups; a low-intensity civil war with rival Fatah, the ruling party of the PA; and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. Last summer a militant group called Jund Ansar Allah [1], or the Warriors of God, one of a handful of Al Qaeda-inspired factions, declared the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Gaza — a flagrant rejection of Hamas’ authority. Hamas security forces struck instantly and mercilessly at the Warriors, killing more than twenty members, including the group’s leader, Abdel-Latif Moussa. In one stroke, the Hamas leadership sent a message to foes and friends alike that it will not tolerate global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda, which want to turn Gaza into a theater of transnational jihad. Despite the crushing of Moussa’s outfit, the extremist challenge persists. The Israeli siege, in place since 2006, along with the suffering and despair it has caused among Gaza’s 1.4 million inhabitants, has driven hundreds of young Palestinians into the arms of small Salafist extremist factions [2] that accuse Hamas of forfeiting the armed struggle and failing to implement Shariah law. Hamas leaders appear to be worried about the proliferation of these factions and have instructed clerics to warn worshipers against joining such bands. Compared with these puritanical and nihilistic groups, Hamas is well within the mainstream of Islamist politics. Operationally and ideologically, there are huge differences between Hamas and jihadi extremists such as Al Qaeda — and there’s a lot of bad blood. Hamas is a broad-based religious/nationalist resistance whose focus and violence is limited to Palestine/Israel, while Al Qaeda is a small, transnational terrorist network that has carried out attacks worldwide [3]. Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have vehemently criticized Hamas for its willingness to play politics and negotiate with Israel. Hamas leaders have responded that they know what is good for their people, and they have made it crystal clear they have no interest in transnational militancy. Their overriding goal is political and nationalist rather than ideological and global: to empower Palestinians and liberate the occupied Palestinian territories. Unlike Al Qaeda and other fringe factions, Hamas is a viable social movement with an extensive social network and a large popular base that has been estimated at several hundred thousand. Given its tradition of sensitivity and responsiveness to Palestinian public opinion, a convincing argument could be made that the recent changes in the organization’s conduct can be attributed to the high levels of poverty, unemployment and isolation of Palestinians in Gaza, who fear an even greater deterioration of conditions there. A further example of Hamas’ political and social priorities is its decision to agree in principle to an Egyptian-brokered deal that sketches out a path to peace with Fatah. After two years of bitter and violent division, the warring parties came very close to agreement in October. The deal collapsed at the last moment, but talks continue. There are two points to make about the Egyptian role: First, Hamas leaders say they feel somewhat betrayed by the Egyptians because after pressure from the Americans, Cairo unilaterally revised the final agreed-upon text without consulting the Hamas negotiating team. Second, many Palestinian and Arab observers think Egypt is in no hurry to conclude the Fatah-Hamas talks. They contend that faced with regional challenges and rivals (Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia), the Mubarak regime views its brokering process in the Palestinian-Israeli theater as an important regional asset and a way to solidify its relationship with Washington. Despite its frequently reactionary rhetoric, Hamas is a rational actor, a conclusion reached by former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, who also served as Ariel Sharon’s national security adviser and who is certainly not a peacenik. The Hamas leadership has undergone a transformation "right under our very noses" by recognizing that "its ideological goal is not attainable and will not be in the foreseeable future," Halevy wrote in the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot just before the 2008 attack on Gaza. He believes Hamas is ready and willing to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The US Army Strategic Studies Institute [4] published a similar analysis just before the Israeli offensive, concluding that Hamas was considering a shift of its position and that "Israel’s stance toward [Hamas]...has been a major obstacle to substantive peacemaking." Indeed, it could be argued that Hamas has moved closer to a vision of peace consistent with international law and consensus (two separate states in historic Palestine, divided more or less along the ’67 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and recognition of all states in the region) than the current Israeli governing coalition. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vehemently opposes the establishment of a genuinely viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and is opposed to giving up any part of Jerusalem — and Netanyahu’s governing coalition is more right wing and pro-settlement than he is. Hamas’ political evolution and deepening moderation stand in stark contrast to the rejectionism of the Netanyahu government and call into question which parties are "hardline" and which are "extremist." And at the regional level, a sea change has occurred in the official Arab position toward the Jewish state (the Arab League’s 2002 Beirut Declaration, subsequently reiterated, offers full recognition and diplomatic relations if Israel accepts the international consensus regarding a two-state solution) [5], while the attitudes of the Israeli ruling elite have hardened. This marks a transformation of regional politics and a reversal of roles. Observers might ask, if Hamas is so eager to accept a two-state solution, why doesn’t it simply accept the three conditions for engagement required by the so-called diplomatic Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations): recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence and acceptance of all previous agreements (primarily, the Oslo Accords)? In my interviews with Hamas officials, they stress that while they have made significant concessions to the Quartet, it has not lifted the punishing sanctions against Hamas, nor has it pressed Israel to end its siege, which has caused a dire humanitarian crisis. In addition, Hamas leaders believe that recognition of Israel is the last card in their hand and are reluctant to play it before talks even begin. Their diplomatic starting point will be to demand that Israel recognize the national rights of the Palestinians and withdraw from the occupied territories — but it will not be their final position. There can be no viable, lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians if Hamas is not consulted and if the Palestinians remain divided, with two warring authorities in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas has the means and public support to undermine any agreement that does not address the legitimate rights and claims of the Palestinian people. Its Fatah/PA rival lacks a popular mandate and the legitimacy needed to implement a resolution of the conflict. PA President Mahmoud Abbas has been weakened by a series of blunders of his own making, and with his moral authority compromised in the eyes of a sizable Palestinian constituency, Abbas is yesterday’s man — no matter how long he remains in power as a lame duck, and whether or not he competes in the upcoming presidential elections. If the United States and Europe engaged Hamas, encouraging it to continue moderating its views instead of ignoring it or, worse yet, seeking its overthrow, the West could test the extent of Hamas’ evolution. So far the strategy of isolation and military confrontation — pursued in tandem by Israel and the United States — has not appeared to weaken Hamas significantly. If anything, it has radicalized hundreds of young Palestinians, who have joined extremist factions and reinforced the culture of martyrdom and nihilism. All the while, the siege of Gaza has left a trail of untold pain and suffering. If the Western powers don’t engage Hamas, they will never know if it can evolve into an open, tolerant and peaceful social movement. The jury is still out on whether the Islamist movement can make that painful and ideologically costly transition. But the claim that engaging Hamas legitimizes it does not carry much weight; the organization derives its legitimacy from the Palestinian people, a mandate resoundingly confirmed in the free and fair elections of 2006. To break the impasse and prevent gains by more extremist factions, the Obama administration and Congress should support a unified Palestinian government that could negotiate peace with Israel. Whatever they think of its ideology, US officials should acknowledge that Hamas is a legitimately elected representative of the Palestinian people, and that any treaty signed by a rump Fatah/PA will not withstand the test of time. And instead of twisting Cairo’s arms in a rejectionist direction, Washington should encourage its Egyptian ally to broker a truce between Hamas and Fatah and thus repair the badly frayed Palestinian governing institutions. If the Obama administration continues to shun engagement with Hamas, Europe ought to take the lead in establishing an official connection. European governments have already dealt with Lebanon’s Hizbullah, a group similar to Hamas in some respects, and they possess the skills, experience and political weight to help broker a viable peace settlement. Like it or not, Hamas is the most powerful organization in the occupied territories. It is deeply entrenched in Palestinian society. Neither Israel nor the Western powers can wish it away. The good news, if my reading is correct, is that Hamas has changed, is willing to meet some of the Quartet’s conditions and is making domestic political preparations for further changes. But if Hamas is not engaged, and if the siege of Gaza and Palestinian suffering continue without hope of ending the political impasse, there is a real danger of a regional war. Attached documents   HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics (PDF - 418.2 kb)   Fawaz A. Gerges Professor of Middle Eastern politics and international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science at the University of London. His most recent book is Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy(Harcourt). [1] Did Israel Back Recent ‘Challenge’ to Hamas in the Gaza Strip?,Voltaire Network, 16 August 2009. [2] Israel involved in several attacks in Iraq, Voltaire Network, 20 July 2005. [3] Our terrorists, by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Voltaire Network, 15 November 2009. [4] See attached document: HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics, Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, December 23, 2008. [5] The Beirut Declaration, Voltaire Network, March 28, 2002.

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