Prof. Paul Eidelberg
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is desperate. He can hardly contain himself, especially his tongue, which, after all, is pretty much the basis of his reputation. He desperately wants a “final accord with the Palestinian Authority, and not an interim deal.” And he wants to negotiate a final accord with PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who is having difficulty keeping his Fatah faction united behind him if only because Hamas is opposed to any accord with Israel.
As reported by The Jerusalem Post (November 20, 2009), Netanyahu said in “private meetings that he thinks a final agreement could be reached, but that it would take courageous steps.” He contends that “Abbas, who has said he would step down because of the stymied diplomatic process, should not be ‘counted out.’” The Post goes on to report: “Netanyahu recalled that in 1971 no one thought that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would eventually make peace with Israel, and that it was too early to ‘write off’ Abbas. Sometimes conventional wisdom is wrong,’ he was quoted as saying.”
Netanyahu is indeed desperate, so much so that he ignores history and makes nonsense of what his own protégé Yuval Steinitz has said about Egypt. Here I will quote what Middle East expert Daniel Pipes wrote in a New York Sun article of November 21, 2006: “Time to Recognize Failure of [the Egypt-Israel] Treaty”:
“Ninety-two percent of respondents in a recent poll of one thousand Egyptians over 18 years of age called Israel an enemy state. In contrast, a meager 2% saw Israel as ‘a friend to Egypt.’
“These hostile sentiments express themselves in many ways, including a popular song titled ‘I hate Israel,’ venomously anti-Semitic political cartoons, bizarre conspiracy theories, and terrorist attacks against visiting Israelis. Egypt's leading democracy movement, Kifiya, recently launched an initiative to collect a million signatures on a petition demanding the annulment of the March 1979 Egypt-Israel treaty.
“Also, the Egyptian government has permitted large quantities of weapons to be smuggled into Gaza to use against Israeli border towns. Yuval Steinitz, an Israeli legislator specializing in Egypt-Israel relations, estimates that fully 90% of PLO and Hamas explosives come from Egypt.
“Cairo may have no apparent enemies, but the impoverished Egyptian state sinks massive resources into a military buildup. According to the Congressional Research Service, it purchased $6.5 billion worth of foreign weapons in the years 2001-04, more than any other state in the Middle East. In contrast, the Israeli government bought only $4.4 billion worth during that period and the Saudi one $3.8 billion.”
Pipes goes on to say:
“Egypt ranked as the third largest purchaser of arms in the entire developing world, following only population giants China and India. It has the tenth largest standing army in the world, well over twice of Israel’s
“This long, ugly record of hostility exists despite a peace treaty with Israel. Hailed at the time by both Egypt’s president Anwar el-Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin as a ‘historic turning point,’ U.S. president Jimmy Carter hoped it would begin a new era when “violence no longer dominates the M idle East.” I too shared this enthusiasm.
“With the benefit of retrospect, however, we see that the treaty did palpable harm in at least two ways. First, it opened the American arsenal and provided American funding to purchase the latest in weaponry. As a result, for the first time in the Arab-Israeli conflict, an Arab armed force may have reached parity with its Israeli counterpart.
“Second, it spurred anti-Zionism. I lived for nearly three years in Egypt in the 1970s, before Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem in late 1977, and I recall the relatively low interest in Israel at that time. Israel was plastered all over the news but it hardly figured in conversations. Egyptians seemed happy to delegate this issue to their government. Only after the treaty, which many Egyptians saw as a betrayal, did they themselves take direct interest. The result was the emergence of a more personal, intense, and bitter form of anti-Zionism.
“The same pattern was replicated in Jordan, where the 1994 treaty with Israel soured popular attitudes. To a lesser extent, the 1993 Palestinian accords and even the aborted 1983 Lebanon treaty prompted similar responses. In all four of these cases, diplomatic agreements prompted a surge in hostility toward Israel.
“Defenders of the ‘peace process’ answer that, however hostile Egyptians' attitudes and however large their arsenal, the treaty has held; Cairo has in fact not made war on Israel since 1979. However frigid the peace, peace it has been.”
To this Pipes replies:
“If the mere absence of active warfare counts as peace, then peace has also prevailed between Syria and Israel for decades, despite their formal state of war. Damascus lacks a treaty with Jerusalem, but it also lacks modern American weaponry. Does an antique signature on a piece of paper offset Egypt's Abrams tanks, F-16 fighter jets, and Apache attack helicopters?
“I think not. In retrospect, it becomes apparent that multiple fallacies and wishful predictions fueled Arab-Israeli diplomacy:
● Once signed, agreements signed by unelected Arab leaders would convince the masses to give up their ambitions to eliminate Israel.
● These agreements would be permanent, with no backsliding, much less duplicity.
● Other Arab states would inevitably follow suit.
● War can be concluded through negotiations rather than by one side giving up.
“The time has come [Pipes concluded] to recognize the Egypt-Israel treaty—usually portrayed as the glory and ornament of Arab-Israel diplomacy—as the failure it has been, and to draw the appropriate lessons in order not to repeat its mistakes.”
As for Sadat, here is what the present writer said all too many years ago:
● In an interview with al-Anwar on June 22, 1975, Sadat avowed: “The effort of our generation is to return to the 1967 borders. Afterward the next generation will carry the responsibility.”
● And in a New York Times interview dated October 19, 1980, Sadat boasted: “Poor Menachem [Begin], he has his problems ... After all, I got back ... the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and what has Menachem got? A piece of paper.”
● Finally, a year after signing the March 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Sadat ominously declared: “Despite the present differences with the Arab 'rejectionist' rulers over the Egyptian peace initiative, the fact remains that these differences are only tactical not strategic, temporary not permanent.”
So much for Mr. Netanyahu’s desperately glowing view of Sadat and the Egypt-Israel treaty as precedent for a “final agreement” with the Palestinian Authority. Pity Netanyahu, who voted in the Sharon Government for unilateral disengagement from Gaza, lacks the conventional wisdom he disparages.



























